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Abstract
Recent  dynamics  in  the  social  and  economic  environment  have  facilitated  the
emergence of new –hybrid– organizational forms, a phenomenon that has been frequently
associated with the blurring of boundaries among the for-profit, public and nonprofit sectors.
Focusing  on  social  enterprises,  a  particular  type  of  hybrid  organizations  emerging  in  the
nonprofit  sector,  this  paper  suggests  that  the  appearance  of  hybrid  organizational  forms
triggers behavioral changes at the micro –the organizational– level, but hardly affects sector
boundaries. The paper offers a fresh conceptualization of social enterprises, and furthermore
presents an original way to classify traditional and new organizational forms according to
economic, public and social authority. The new organizational landscape is illustrated.  
Keywords:  Social  Enterprises,  New  organizational  forms,  Non-profit  sector,  Social
Authority. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AND THEIR PLACE 
IN THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE
Introduction
Recent  dynamics  in  the  social  and  economic  environment  significantly  affect  the
traditional  organizational  landscape.  They  seem  to  blur  boundaries  between  the  public,
the nonprofit, and the for-profit sectors, and to facilitate the emergence of new organizational
forms  (Bozeman  1987;  Waddock  and  Post  1995;  Fowler  2000).  We  observe  nonprofit  and
public  organizations  applying  business  standards,  and  for-profit  firms  opening  up  to  the
provision of public goods. From the perspective of nonprofit firms, these dynamics stem from
increasing competitive pressures which represent a threat to their ambitions as well as to their
survival. These competitive pressures include rising costs, competition for decreasing donations
and grants, competition with commercial firms, and less dependence on current funding sources
(Dees  1998).  In  response,  nonprofit  organizations  are  increasingly  adopting  the  type  of
entrepreneurial management approaches prevalent in for-profit companies. This phenomenon
has facilitated their transformation into social enterprises, a new type of organization informally
known as hybrids, and has given the impression of blurring boundaries between traditional
sectors (Waddock and Post 1995; Wallace 1999; Fowler 2000; Dees, Emerson et al. 2001). 
While we acknowledge the importance of the phenomenon, we argue that popular
notions of “blurred boundaries” might be impetuous. To properly assess whether boundaries
are actually distorted, it is important to distinguish between two levels of analysis: a macro
level that refers to the three societal sectors –nonprofit, for-profit, and public– and a micro
level  that  refers  to  the  organizations  within  the  particular  sectors.  At  a  macro  level  we
observe that the boundaries of the three sectors remain largely unaffected, i.e., nonprofit, for-
profit, and public organizations maintain their own distinct (legal) status and characteristics.
At a micro level, however, we do observe momentous changes that require a rethinking and
redrawing of the conventional organizational landscape. New, altered and mixed behavior by
some  nonprofit,  for-profit,  and  public  organizations  encourage  their  transformation  into
hybrid organizational forms. It is this transformation process going on at the micro level that
results in the misleading impression that sector boundaries are blurring. 
A  number  of  scholars  have  attempted  to  depict  the  organizational  landscape.
Bozeman  (1987),  for  example,  categorized  different  organizations  according  to  their
behavior.  He  advanced  the  notion  of  publicness –defined  as  the  extent  to  which  an
organization is affected by “public” constraints– in order to differentiate between all forms of
organizations.    His  proposed  publicness-grid,  which  distinguishes  between  economic  and
political authority in order to categorize all types of organizations, serves as the starting point
of our analysis. While useful in the context of the conventional landscape, we argue that this
categorization falls short when it comes to depicting the newly emerging landscape. To fully
capture  the  variety  of  organizational  forms,  we  introduce  a  third—social—dimension  to
redraw a map of today’s organizations. In  sum,  this  paper  aims  at  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  recent
changes in the organizational landscape. In the next sections we first define and describe the
social enterprise, the new organizational form, or hybrid, that causes the apparent blurring of
boundaries among sectors. Second, we introduce Bozeman’s (1987) publicness-grid and add
a third –social authority– dimension, defined as the degree to which market transactions rely
on reputation and trust. Finally, we present the new organizational landscape, illustrating that
the apparent blurring of boundaries among sectors is actually occurring at a micro-level –the
world of organizations– rather than at the sector level. 
New Organizational Forms In The Nonprofit Sector
Although we recognize that hybrid organizational forms can develop within and
between all three sectors, in this paper we particularly focus on the formation of hybrids in
the context of the nonprofit sector. We define hybrids as formal organizations that embrace
both profit and nonprofit components (Dess and Anderson 2003) and subsequently refer to
them as social enterprises.
Social Enterprises
If an “enterprise” is defined as an “undertaking, a business venture or company”, a
social enterprise is a private undertaking committed to achieve a social purpose, one that
incorporates  “traditional  resources  of  nonprofit  organizations  (donations  and  voluntary
participation), commercial revenue (originating both from public and private customers and
founders), and business activity” (Borzaga and Solari 2001: 333). Numerous examples of
social enterprises can be found in various industries such as services, distribution, retailing,
and manufacturing (Mitchell, Kanigel et al. 2000). 
According to the –mainly descriptive– literature, two types of social enterprises can
be identified. First, social enterprises can exist as subsidiaries of nonprofit organizations, i.e.
as initiatives of nonprofit organizations in search of financial self-sustainability (Boschee
1995;  Wallace  1999).  And  second,  they  can  exist  independently  from  other  nonprofit
organizations, e.g. as independent social enterprises which pursue a specific social objective,
such as to fight social exclusion and provide social and community care services (Borzaga
and Defourny 2001; Evers 2001). Depending on their duration, independent social enterprises
can  also  exist  as  catalytic  alliances,  i.e.,  as  short-term  oriented  enterprises  that  aim  at
increasing the awareness of a particular social problem and incorporating it in the public
agenda (Waddock and Post 1991, 1995). 
In the remainder of this section we elaborate on the scope of social enterprises, their
main  dimensions,  their  role  in  society,  their  potential  competitive  advantages,  and  the
particular challenges they face. 
Scope.  The  working  scope  of  a  social  enterprise  can  encompass  three  types  of
business: “affirmative business”, “direct services business”, and “catalytic alliances” (Boschee
1995;  Waddock  and  Post  1995;  Wallace  1999).  1)  Affirmative  businesses  provide  jobs,
competitive salaries, career opportunities and ownership for disadvantaged people and can be
found in an ample range of industries (Boschee 1995). Among others of its kind, Pioneer
Human Services in Seattle is one of the largest and is self-financing. It provides jobs, housing,
training and many other support services to at-risk individuals and generates revenues up to
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composed  of  ex-offenders  and  former  substance  abusers,  and  serves  more  than  5000
customers.  Its  largest  business  is  a  light-metal  fabricator  that  has  become  Boeing’s  sole
supplier  of  sheet-metal  liners.  Additional  businesses  are  a  downtown  hotel  in  Seattle,  a
wholesale food business that services nearly 400 food banks in 20 states, a corporate cafeteria
for Starbucks Coffee Company, a daily institutional food business, and a property management
company  (Shore  1999;  Wallace  1999).  2)  Direct  services  businesses  commonly  aim  at
improving the social situation of emotionally disturbed kids, battered women, homeless people,
recovering  substance  abusers,  the  terminally  ill,  among  others,  through  community-based
training and care services (Boschee 1995; Wallace 1999). One is Rubicon Programs Inc., a
nonprofit  organization  in  San  Francisco,  California  that  provides  social  and  rehabilitative
services and is supported by social purpose enterprises that generate a little under US$ 3 million
per year (Wallace 1999). 3) Lastly, catalytic alliances deal with major social problems without
apparent short-term solution. Their goal is to increase the level of public awareness about a
particular social problem through high profile publicity campaigns; campaigns that pressure
policy makers to put the issue on their agenda and invite other public, private, or nonprofit
organizations to work on the problem (Waddock and Post 1995). Hands Across America, for
example, was an impressive endeavor that raised more than US$ 16 million to help the hungry
and homeless in the United States by motivating more than six million people to hold hands
simultaneously throughout 16 states (Waddock and Post 1991, 1995). 
Social enterprises can be distinguished according to two important characteristics:
services life span (short vs. long term), and profit distribution (reinvest vs. distribute) (Mair
and Noboa 2002). While affirmative and direct services businesses typically embrace a long-
term orientation, catalytic alliances are usually short-lived organizations (Waddock and Post
1995). Since traditional, and in many cases profitable, nonprofit organizations by definition
do not have owners, they are not entitled to distribute their profits to anyone who exercises
control  over  the  organization  (Hansmann  1996).  In  contrast  to  traditional  nonprofit
organizations, some social enterprises, especially those established as cooperatives, operate
under a more relaxed profit distribution constraint and are therefore permitted to wholly or
partially distribute profits among their beneficiaries in the form of additional products or
services (Boschee 1995; Wallace 1999; Defourny 2001).
Dimensions.  Social  enterprises  incorporate  donations  and  voluntary  participation,
commercial revenue, and business activity (Borzaga and Solari 2001), and encompass both
an  economic  and  a  social  dimension  (Defourny  2001:  16-18).  First,  social  enterprises
embrace an economic dimension as they are directly involved –as one of the main reasons for
their existence– in the production of goods and provision of services to the public at large.
For example, in Spain, Asociación Atzegui, which belongs to the Grupo Gureak, founded an
enterprise called Talleres Gureak (Gureak Workshops) in 1982. Aiming at the employment of
persons with disabilities in Guipuzcoa (Basque Country), Talleres Gureak developed into one
of the foremost organization in the field of social and work integration. It provided 2,008 jobs
in 1997, of which only 174 were for persons who did not have disabilities (Vidal 2001).
Second, social enterprises can also be created by individuals who act independently from
existing associations or organizations, but nevertheless can receive public subsidies. Third,
social entrepreneurs assume at least partially the risk of the new venture and, together with
the  effort  of  their  employees,  determine  its  financial  sustainability.  And  fourth,  social
enterprises are characterized by a minimum amount of paid work, a factor that discriminates
them from other nonprofit organizations.
All social enterprises embrace a social dimension. First, in addition to increased
social responsibility at a local level, they have an explicit mission to benefit the community
and a specific group of disadvantaged citizens. Second, unlike for-profit organizations, social
3enterprises are ruled by the “one member, one vote” principle, meaning that capital providers
equally share the decision-making rights with other stakeholders. Third, social enterprises, as
one  of  the  few  truly  democratic  institutions  in  society,  include  representatives  of  most
stakeholder groups in their governing body. And last but not least, in contrast to nonprofit
organizations, social enterprises operate under a more relaxed profit distribution constraint,
which allows them to fully or partially distribute profits among their beneficiaries without
fully complying with profit-maximizing principles (Boschee 1995; Wallace 1999; Defourny
2001). 
In sum, the combination of social and economic dimensions makes social enterprises
an original and highly complex type of organization in the nonprofit sector (Defourny 2001). 
Role in society. Social enterprises play a key role in society as they ensure a better
distribution  of  resources,  create  jobs  and  social  capital,  and  promote  local  development
(Borzaga  and  Defourny  2001).  They  provide  a  better  distribution  of  resources  through
citizens’ volunteered time and donations that substitute public (governmental) resources and
furthermore create public awareness. They appear as a perfectly suited organization for the
creation of jobs and social capital by having revenue-generating capacity, lacking a profit-
maximizing  behavior,  operating  with  low  costs,  having  a  good  location  and  standing  in
communities, and, importantly, having enormous capacity to earn public trust. In contrast,
other  well-known  organizations  in  society  do  not  have  the  same  capabilities.  Traditional
nonprofit  organizations,  for  example,  are  financially  constrained  and  depend  solely  on
donations and government funds; organizations with profit-maximizing behavior do not have
the capability to generate the same amount of trust among citizens; and governments have
only  limited  funds  to  spend  on  social  purposes.  Lastly,  social  enterprises  promote  local
development by providing salaries that improve the living conditions of workers, the well-
being of communities, the level of social integration, and increase citizens’ solidarity, mutual
help, trust, and participation. 
Competitive advantages.  Independent  social  enterprises  have  several  competitive
advantages over traditional nonprofit, public, or for-profit organizations (1). One of the most
important is their unique capability to offer a highly valued mix of extrinsic and intrinsic
rewards for their emplyees (2). The favorable reward system, together with the high degree of
information sharing between stakeholders, accounts for the fact that social enterprises are
associated  with  a  higher  level  of  distributive  and  procedural  justice  than  other  types  of
organizations (Borzaga and Solari 2001). As a result, it is not surprising that employees in
nonprofit organizations seem to be more motivated than employees working in for-profit or
public  organizations.  Besides  high  levels  of  motivation,  other  important  competitive
advantages consist in the desirable position to understand and meet local market demand, and
in the ability to integrate with regional suppliers and buyers, allowing them to better serve
their clients than other for-profit or public institutions (Porter 1995a, 1995b). 
Challenges. Despite these competitive advantages, social enterprises face a number
of challenges. Borzaga and Solari (2001) distinguish between endogenous and exogenous
challenges. According to these authors, one of the most important endogenous challenges
consists  in  the  need  to  simultaneously  legitimize  their  existence  and  develop  their
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(1) Competitive  advantages  have  been  mainly  discussed  in  the  context  of  for-profit  organizations  (Porter,
1980). In this paper we argue that social enterprises do adopt business-like approaches. Therefore, we find it
appropriate to apply this term when discussing social enterprises belonging to the nonprofit sector. 
(2) Extrinsic rewards in the context of social enterprises refer to flexible working hours, salaries and training,
while intrinsic rewards consist in autonomy, degree of participation moral goals, and development. competitive advantage. Borzaga and Solari suggest that to legitimize their role in society
social enterprises should aggressively communicate their mission, establish their reputation
both nationally and within their communities, pursue opportunities to achieve low costs and
financial  sustainability,  monitor  the  evolution  of  social  needs,  and  innovate  in  service
delivery. In addition, in order to sustain their competitive advantage, social enterprises must
continuously invest in their employees’ expertise, skills, and motivation; improve service and
product quality; and keep top quality management on board (Borzaga and Solari 2001). One
of the central exogenous challenges social enterprises face is their reliance on a supportive
legislative  and  regulatory  environment  that  not  only  facilitates  their  legitimacy,  but  also
provides clear incentives to increase their contributions to society. Thus, social enterprises are
constantly confronted with the need to detect and pursue innovative ways to achieve such a
favorable environment.  
In  addition  to  these  challenges,  social  enterprises  face  internal  weaknesses  that
threaten  their  long-term  viability.  If  social  enterprises  fail  to  achieve  sufficient  revenue-
generating capacity to guarantee their financial sustainability, they risk suffering the fate of
many  traditional  nonprofit  organizations  which  rely  almost  exclusively  on  donations  and
subsidies. If the diversity of stakeholders in the Board of Directors slows down decision-
making in the organization, increasing governance costs will transform a potential strength
into weakness. Finally, if they fail to achieve economies of scale, social enterprises will face
the cost disadvantages of limited size (Borzaga and Defourny 2001).
So far we have defined and described social enterprises, a newly emerging hybrid
organizational form that is widely seen as causing a blurring of boundaries among sectors. In
the second part of this paper we sustain our argument that the emergence of organizational
forms  has  a  significant  effect  at  the  micro—the  organizational—level,  while  sector
boundaries remain largely unaffected. We build on traditional classifications of organizations,
while introducing an additional—social authority—dimension, and present the new landscape
incorporating both traditional and newly emerging organizational forms.   
Towards a new organizational landscape
The emergence of new organizational forms –commonly known as hybrids– has
altered the traditional landscape of organizational forms. But has it also blurred boundaries
between the sectors? To answer this question it is important to distinguish between effects at
the macro –the sector– level, and consequences for the micro –the organizational– level. 
The formal legal status of organizations allows us to associate every organization in
society with a particular sector (Bozeman 1987; Dees and Anderson 2003). In other words,
nonprofit  and  for-profit  organizations  have  their  own  formal  legal  status,  which  can  be
conceived as the sector boundary. As the legal status does not change when a nonprofit
organization adopts more managerial approaches and moves towards a hybrid form, we claim
that at the macro –sector– level boundaries are not blurring. At most, one could argue that
sector boundaries are expanding (or getting closer to each other) to host the new hybrid forms
observable at the micro level analysis of organizations.
While the legal status is the principal focus at the macro –sector– level, the analysis
at the micro level centers on the economic status of organizations, i.e. the analysis of the
characteristics of products and markets to differentiate public from private (nonprofit and for-
profit) organizations. This micro-level deals with the analysis of whether “a good or service
provided by the organization is exclusionary (whether it is possible to levy user charges),
5whether there is a market for the goods or services produced by the organization, whether one
person’s consumption of the good has an effect on the amount available for others, whether
there are significant externalities or spillover effects, and whether the good or service is most
efficiently  financed  by  a  collective  rather  than  by  individuals”  (Bozeman  1987:  33).
Isomorphic forces in this context refer to the adoption of for-profit practices in nonprofit and
public organizations, and socially responsible practices in for-profit organizations. It is at this
level –the world of organizations– that “isomorphic” forces among organizations from every
sector result in the creation of social enterprises, or hybrid organizations, which calls for a
repositioning within the organizational landscape.
A  wide  variety  of  attempts  have  been  made  to  categorize  organizational  forms.
Conventional  approaches  to  categorize  various  types  of  organizations  typically  involve  a
continuum ranging from government or purely philanthropic institutions at one extreme to
purely commercial organizations at the other (Wallace 1999; Dees, Emerson et al. 2001).
Dees, Emerson et al. (2001), for example, use a number of criteria, such as beneficiaries,
capital base, workforce or suppliers to emphasize differences between organizational forms.
See Table 1 for an illustration. Most organizations fit somewhere along the continuum (Dees,
1998). 
Table 1. The Social Enterprise Spectrum
Purely Philanthropic Purely Commercial
Mission Appeal to goodwill Appeal to self-interest
Mission-driven Market-driven
Social value creation Economic value creation
Beneficiaries Pay nothing Pay full market rates
Capital Donations and grants Market-rate capital
Workforce Volunteers Market-rate compensation
Suppliers Make in-kind donations Charge market prices
Source: Adapted from Dees, Emerson et al. (2001). 
While the simplicity inherent in these continuum approaches constitutes a strength
when comparing traditional organizational forms belonging to a particular sector, it turns into
a weakness when trying to locate newly emerging organizational forms.  In other words,
continuum approaches do not suffice to clearly differentiate between traditional and new
organizational forms. Consequently, Bozeman (1987), among others, suggests breaking free
from  conventional  classifications  and  proposes  the  publicness  grid,  a  two-dimensional
construct that permits to successfully locate traditional organizations and incorporate new
hybrid forms. 
The Publicness-Grid: Economic and Political Authority
According to Bozeman (1987), organizations and their structure are determined by
economic and political factors, which in turn affect their behavior and effectiveness. He notes
that the word public usually refers to the legal status of a governmental organization, but fails
to  differentiate  between  nonprofit  and  for-profit  organizations.  His  notion  of  publicness
–defined as the extent to which an organization is affected by “public” constraints (political
authority)–  provides  a  more  fine-grained  categorization  instrument.  Bozeman  categorizes
groups of organizations according to their behavior and therefore assumes a fixed level of
6publicness for organizations that are members of the same group within each of the three
sectors (for-profit, public, and nonprofit). According to his approach, for example, all small
voluntary organizations share the same level of publicness. The same can be said of all other
groups  of  organizations  (corporations,  nonprofits,  etc.).  For  example,  many  private,
commercial firms within the aerospace industry in the U.S have a high level of publicness,
reflected  in  the  government’s  influence  in  assigning  sales  contracts,  auditing  contracts’
profits,  funding  R&D  projects  and  capital  investments,  and  preventing  firms  from  going
bankrupt (Bozeman 1987).   
We argue that the level of publicness is specific to each organization, because it is
determined by the interaction between different market forces and the organization (Boschee
1995; Dees 1998). From the nonprofit sector perspective, for example, these market forces
refer to the existence and intensity of competition for nonprofits’ funds or donations, human
resources,  and  customers;  pressures  from  suppliers,  distributors  and  customers;  threat  of
product or service substitution; and entry barriers (Porter 1980; Oster 1995). The greater the
pressure these forces exert on a nonprofit organization, the more it will perceive the need to
act like a commercial enterprise in order to survive, the more it will resemble a for-profit firm
coping  with  its  environment,  and  the  more  likely  its  location  within  the  organizational
landscape  will  shift.  However,  this  does  not  imply  that  nonprofit  organizations  become
‘camouflaged for-profit companies’. Research shows that when competing with for-profit
firms, their behavior remains different from the behavior of for-profit companies (Weisbrod
1998). In the health sector, for example, nonprofit firms that adopt business-like approaches
are still more willing to receive patients regardless of their ability to pay than for-profit
organizations.
According to Bozeman (1987), organizations are more private or public to the extent
that they exert or are constrained by economic or political authority, respectively. Economic
authority rests on self-interest and mainly refers to the degree of transferability of ownership
and distribution of residual benefits. Whereas for-profit organizations have a high degree of
economic authority, nonprofit organizations, due to the absence of owners—understood as
those  with  the  rights  to  control  the  organization  and  to  appropriate  profits  (Hansmann
1996)—score low in this dimension (Bozeman 1987). The nature of political authority is
more complex and encompasses three types depending on its source.  First, primary political
authority, exercised by individual citizens, represents the heart of any political system and
rests  on  the  citizens’  grant  of  legitimacy  to  government  leadership.  Unlike  unstable
democracies, where governments may not be entirely legitimized, in stable ones this type of
political authority has little impact on organizational behavior. Second, secondary political
authority,  exercised  by  public  authorities,  refers  to  the  power  of  elected  and  non-elected
public officials to act “on behalf of the citizenry” (Bozeman 1987: 67). This level of political
authority is perhaps the one that has most influence on organizational behavior, taking the
form  of  “statutes,  administrative  rules  and  regulations,  executive  orders,  and  judicial
mandates” (Bozeman 1987: 72). And third, tertiary political authority, exercised by NGOs
and private citizens, delegated by public officials to act on behalf of the government. This
level of political authority affects organizational behavior dramatically, since by acting on
behalf of government, the organization’s behavior not only is affected by publicness, but also
becomes public. There are some examples of private organizations granted tertiary political
authority:  government-owned  contractor-operated  Department  of  Energy  laboratories,  the
American Bar Association licensing boards, physician’s review boards, etc. 
In sum, the publicness grid allows us to capture both old and new organizational
forms,  categorizing  organizations  in  a  comparative  manner  along  the  two  –political  and
economic authority– dimensions, and permitting an assessment of the behavior of individual
7organizations and groups of organizations. Thus, the level of publicness significantly reflects
outcome variables such as effectiveness, as well as behavioral variables such as goal setting,
resource allocation, and control (Bozeman 1987).
Introducing Social Authority 
Despite its parsimony and simplicity, the publicness grid is not free of controversy. It
is  difficult  to  operationalize,  and  also  places  excessive  weight  on  public  and  for-profit
organizations to the detriment of nonprofit institutions. In fact, Bozeman himself explicitly
mentions  that  in  the  case  of  nonprofit  organizations  the  mix  of  authority  levels  is
“particularly arbitrary” (Bozeman 1987: 95). 
In this paper we are aiming at disentangling authority structures, particularly within
the  nonprofit  sector.  We  build  on  Bozeman’s  typology  and  complement  the  traditional
publicness  grid  by  adding  social  authority  as  a  third  dimension  in  order  to  facilitate
the location of nonprofit organizations. Thus, we propose that an organization is social to the
extent that it exerts or is constrained by social authority, which refers to the degree to which
market transactions rely on reputation and trust.  
Practical experience suggests that all market transactions must involve a minimum
level of reputation and trust between parties to guarantee a normal functioning of society.
However, the presence of market failures –market power and asymmetry of information–
makes reputation and trust the key characteristics of market transactions in the nonprofit
sector. Hansmann  claims that “nonprofit firms commonly arise where customers are in a
peculiarly poor position to determine, with reasonable cost or effort, the quality or quantity of
the services they receive from a firm” (Hansmann, 1996: 228). Thus, their nature and the way
they operate allow nonprofit organizations to earn reputation and trust in ways organizations
from the public and for-profit sector cannot. First, their non-distribution constraint allows
them to build up reputation and trust, as it signals the absence of motivations to exploit
opportunities on both types of market failures (Hansmann 1996). Since it is difficult for
donors to monitor the allocation of funds, the non-distribution constraint represents a critical
trust-generating mechanism that allows the transaction to take place. For example, a donor in
America who donates money –through a traditional charity– to hunger relief in Africa is
powerless  to  verify  whether  his/her  donation  is  actually  used  to  help  someone  in  Africa
instead of enriching someone else’s bank account.
The non-distribution constraint makes non-profit organizations “well suited to the
production of hard-to-evaluate goods and services, collective goods, and goods and services
with ideological content” (Oster 1995: 20). Collective goods are characterized as non-rival and
non-excludable (Tuckman 1998). Non-rival means that one individual’s consumption does not
affect others’ consumption (e.g., nonprofit radio broadcasts, scientific research, etc.), and non-
excludable means that individuals are entitled to the product or service regardless of their
ability to pay (e.g., housing for the homeless, health care for the poor, etc.).  
Second,  in  addition  to  the  non-distribution  constraint,  nonprofit  organizations
typically take specific actions to generate trust and reputation to facilitate the transaction,
such  as  allowing  donors  to  supervise  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  product  or  service
provided.  For  example,  in  the  performing  arts  where  audiences  are  not  large  enough,
organizations usually have a high proportion of fixed costs over total costs and are typically
unable to cover their fixed costs with the income generated by the service provided. This
situation forces nonprofit organizations to solicit voluntary contributions to survive as a form
8of price discrimination (Hansmann 1996). Interestingly, it is not as difficult as it may seem
to find individuals willing to contribute more than the regular price of the ticket in order to
ensure the viability of the production (Hansmann 1996). 
In sum, to facilitate the location of nonprofit organizations and hybrid forms in the
newly emerging organizational landscape, we build on Bozeman’s (1987) typology and add
social authority as a third dimension. As a result, we propose that all organizations share a
mix of economic, public and social authority. 
The New Organizational Landscape
We  enhance  previous  two-dimensional  classifications  of  organizations  by
introducing social authority as a third important dimension to appropriately depict the new
organizational  landscape.  To  illustrate  the  new  organizational  landscape,  we  build  on
Bozeman’s  publicness  grid  and  include  the  weight  of  the  social  authority  dimension  by
attributing numbers ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). See Figure 1 for a detailed
illustration.
Figure 1. The New Organizational Landscape
Source: Adapted from Bozeman (1987). Numbers refer to the level of social authority.
The  level  of  social  authority  for  each  group  of  organizations  (e.g.,  10  for  small
voluntary organizations) in the new landscape is not intended to be exact. Instead, the value





















































lowhave less social authority than small voluntary organizations but more than corporations.
Therefore, the accuracy of the measure of the level of authority increases when viewed as the
average  level  of  social  authority  of  groups  of  organizations  by  quadrant.  As  will  be
explained, the average level of social authority will be the highest for groups of organizations
low in political and economic authority (quadrant I). The second highest average level will be
for  groups  of  organizations  high  in  political  authority  and  low  in  economic  authority
(quadrant II). By the same token, the second lowest average level will be for groups of
organizations  high  in  political  and  economic  authority  (quadrant  III).  Lastly,  the  lowest
average  level  of  social  authority  will  be  for  those  low  in  political  authority  and  high  in
economic authority (quadrant IV). In sum, as will be explained next, in a counterclockwise
direction, the average level of social authority is the highest for groups of organizations in the
first quadrant, and decreases in each quadrant until it reaches the lowest average point in
the fourth quadrant. 
By definition, in their purest forms, we consider economic and social authority as
opposites. While the former rests on self-interest and is characterized by transferability of
ownership and distribution of profits, the latter is characterized by its non-distributive nature
and is appropriate for market transactions that rely on reputation and trust. Similarly, in their
purest forms, we consider economic authority and political authority as opposites. Bozeman
(1987)  already  depicted  this  inverse  linear  relationship  between  economic  and  political
authority with the owner-managed firm (the highest level of economic authority) and the
traditional public organizations (the highest level of political authority) at extreme points. All
commercial firms in between, as they lose their commercial characteristics and adopt more
public ones, linearly flow towards a publicness mix with less economic and more political
authority.  Equivalently,  all  public  organizations,  as  they  adopt  business-like  behaviors,
linearly change their publicness mix towards more economic and less public authority. 
The relationship between social and political authority requires a deeper analysis.
We need to understand, first, the political authority in nonprofit organizations, and second,
the  social  authority  in  public  organizations.  As  already  depicted  by  Bozeman  (1987),
different  types  of  nonprofit  organizations  (small  voluntary  organizations,  traditional
nonprofits, etc.) face a medium to low level of political authority, manifested mainly in the
use of government funds to provide social services, and in contracts assigned by governments
to provide specific social services. In other words, since nonprofit and public organizations
pursue  the  same  goals,  namely  fairness,  redistribution,  trustworthiness,  public-goods
provision, education, preservation of values, and social innovation (Steinberg and Weisbrod
1998), nonprofits serve as substitutes for the provision of government services. Their role as
substitutes becomes visible in two different circumstances. First, it is visible in the growth of
nonprofit services when the gap between the demand for social services and government
provision augments (Steinberg and Weisbrod 1998). Second, it is visible in the conflicting
relationship between nonprofit and public organizations. Since every private donor’s dollar
given  to  the  nonprofit  sector  is  one  dollar  less  in  taxes  paid  to  the  government,  “when
nonprofits expand, governments lose revenue” (Weisbrod 1998: 7).
On the other hand, public organizations can obtain a medium-high level of social
authority. We stated that an organization is social to the extent that it exerts or is constrained
by social authority, which refers to the degree to which market transactions rely on reputation
and trust. Like nonprofit organizations, public organizations are suitable to operate in the
presence of market failures (e.g. market power and asymmetry of information), and some
face  the  same  non-distribution  constraint  that  eliminates  the  motivation  to  exploit
the opportunity  to  act  on  both  types  of  market  failures  (Hansmann  1996).  However,  the
difference  in  power/influence  structure  between  these  two  types  of  organizations  makes
10nonprofits more suitable to generate a higher level of reputation and trust than governmental
organizations. First, unlike voluntary donors of nonprofit organizations, taxpayers are legally
obliged to contribute to the government; and second, taxpayers not only do not know what
their contribution will be used for but also “must” blindly trust the government’s good use of
tax-collected money. 
Mapping Social Enterprises within the New Organizational Landscape
Based on the arguments laid out in the previous sections, we claim that at a macro
level the emergence of hybrids does not alter the existing boundaries –defined in terms of
legal status– among the three societal –for-profit, nonprofit and public– sectors. From this
macro –legal status– perspective, a nonprofit sector perspective that applies entrepreneurial
skills or/ management techniques still remains an organization within the boundaries of the
nonprofit sector. At a micro –organizational– level, where boundaries are determined in terms
of economic status,  changes in the behavior of traditional nonprofit organizations facilitate
their transformation into a hybrid form (social enterprise). It is the change in behavior that
instigates  a  shift  in  the  organizational  landscape  but  leaves  sector  boundaries  largely
untouched.  The  social  enterprise  moves  from  its  original  position  within  the  group  of
traditional  nonprofits  to  the  group  of  hybrids/social  enterprises,  but  remains  in  the  legal
domain of nonprofit organizations.  
We locate social enterprises, the hybrid forms discussed in this paper, in the middle
of the landscape (see Figure 1). In other words, we argue that social enterprises face an equal
level of economic, public and social authority for the following reasons. First, even though
they do not solely rest on self-interest, they adopt a certain level of self-interest in order to
survive. Second, although social enterprises are not controlled by government officials, they
are not entirely free from government supervision or funding because of the  service they
provide to society, their profit-generating capacity, and their tax-exemption status. And third,
since social enterprises operate in market transactions that rely on reputation and trust, many
take great care to ensure that their self-interested behavior does not alter their nonprofit,
social nature. 
It is important to note that hybrids can emerge within either one of the three sectors.
While in this paper we have focused on hybrids that originate from the nonprofit sector, the
main ideas of this paper can be translated to new organizational forms in the for-profit or the
public sector. 
Conclusion
This paper aimed at a more comprehensive understanding of the implications of
recent  trends  in  the  social  and  economic  environment  which  have  led  to  the  emergence
of new  –hybrid–  organizational  forms.  While  a  number  of  authors  have  argued  that  this
phenomenon significantly alters boundaries among the three traditional sectors, we suggested
that  although  emerging  organizational  forms  have  a  strong  impact  at  the  micro  –the
organizational–  level,  they  hardly  affect  sector  boundaries.  Thus,  instead  of  redefining
sectors, we revised the classification criteria for organizational forms in order to adequately
depict  the  new  organizational  landscape.  To  support  our  argument  we  focused  on  one
particular hybrid form in the nonprofit sector, namely social enterprises. We offered a fresh
and  insightful  conceptualization  of  social  enterprises  and  illustrated  the  effect  of  their
11appearance on the organizational landscape. Building on previous research, we introduced a
classification  instrument  that  distinguishes  organizational  forms  according  to  the  level  of
economic, public and social authority. This approach allowed us to map both traditional and
newly emerging organizational forms and to depict the new organizational landscape in a
comprehensive and accurate manner.
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